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Abstract: Tor is one of the most popular systems for
anonymous communication and censorship circumven-
tion on the web, currently used by millions of users every
day. This puts Tor as a target for attacks by organiza-
tions and governmental bodies whose goal is to hinder
users’ ability to connect to it. These attacks include deep
packet inspection (DPI) to classify Tor traffic as well
as legitimate Tor client impersonation (active probing)
to expose Tor bridges. As a response to Tor-blocking
attempts, the Tor community has developed Pluggable
Transports (PTs), tools that transform the appearance
of Tor’s traffic flow.
In this paper we introduce a new approach aiming to
enhance the PT’s resistance against active probing at-
tacks, as well as white-listing censorship by partitioning
the handshake of the PT from its encrypted communi-
cation. Thus, allowing mixing different PTs, e.g., Scram-
bleSuit for the handshake and FTE for the traffic itself.
We claim that this separation reduces the possibility
of marking Tor related communications. To illustrate
our claim, we introduce DNS-Morph: a new method of
transforming the handshake data of a PT by imitating
a sequence of DNS queries and responses. Using DNS-
Morph, the Tor client acts as a DNS client which sends
DNS queries to the Tor bridge, and receives DNS re-
sponses from it. We implemented and successfully tested
DNS-Morph using one of the PTs (ScrambleSuit), and
verified its capabilities.
Keywords: Tor, UDP, DNS, bootstrapping, bridge, plug-
gable transport, censorship, circumvention
1 Introduction
Internet censorship is the act of inspecting, controlling,
and limiting what can be accessed, published, or viewed
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on the Internet. Organizations and governments engage
in Internet censorship due to variety of reasons, among
them political, moral, or religious. Since Tor became
public in 2002 [11] and started gaining popularity among
users in the world as a system for anonymous commu-
nication and censorship circumvention, many countries
tried to block their citizens’ connections to it. These
attempts started with simple methods like blacklisting
Tor’s website [45] so users would not be able to reach it
and download the Tor client software [42], and got more
sophisticated with time to include actively downloading
the Tor nodes (also called relays) list from the Tor Di-
rectory Servers and blacklisting them, deploying DPI
to search for Tor communication characteristics (e.g.,
Tor’s TLS handshake cipher suite [58]), as well as ac-
tive probing (impersonating a Tor client and connecting
to suspicious servers to check whether they run a Tor
relay) [1, 17, 53].
On the other side of the arms race, the Tor com-
munity did not stand still and developed methods to
bypass the blocking attempts, mainly the introduction
of Tor Bridges1 and Pluggable Transports (PTs).
Pluggable Transports (PTs) [44] are a generic frame-
work for the development and the deployment of cen-
sorship circumvention techniques. Their main goal is to
obfuscate the connection between a Tor client and a
bridge serving as a Tor entry guard, so it looks benign.
The PT consists of two parts as seen in Figure 1, one
is installed on the Tor client side, and the other is in-
stalled on the bridge’s side. The PT exposes a SOCKS
proxy [32] to the Tor client application, and obfuscates
or otherwise transforms the traffic, before forwarding it
to the bridge. On the bridge’s side, the PT Server side
exposes a reverse proxy that accepts connections from
PT clients and decodes the obfuscation/transformation
applied to the traffic, before forwarding it to the actual
bridge application.
Data transmitted between a PT client and a PT
server can be encrypted, chopped into generic lengths,
or otherwise obfuscated in many ways, making it diffi-
1 Bridge: a relay which is unlisted in the public directory servers
lists. The information needed to connect to a bridge is obtained
out-of-Tor (e.g., via BridgeDB [41], an Email, or in person).
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cult for a censor to detect Tor data and block it. Data
transformation/obfuscation and the reverse operations
are done by the Transport Modules/Obfuscation Proto-
cols used by the PT.
Fig. 1. Pluggable Transports Design
As of Sep. 2017,2 the available and deployed ob-
fuscation protocols in the Tor Browser are: obfs3 [27],
obfs4 [28], ScrambleSuit [59], FTE [51], and meek [19].
A brief explanation about each of them can be found in
Section 2. These obfuscation protocols can be divided
into two groups:
1. Random stream protocols (obfs3, obfs4, and Scram-
bleSuit). These protocols’ communication is shaped
as streams of random bytes that cannot be associ-
ated with any known protocol. These protocols have
two phases: a handshake phase in which the two
participating parties securely exchange keys and/or
tickets, and a communication phase, consisting of
exchange of encrypted messages using the estab-
lished keys.
2. Structured stream protocols (FTE and meek),
which try to mimic known white-listed protocols
such as HTTP.
Censoring countries with active probing capability can
expose bridges communicating using obfs3. In addition,
random stream protocols are of the “look-like-nothing”
protocols, which means that they can be identified and
blocked by a censor using a white-listing strategy, as
their fingerprint (including their handshake) does not
fit any known protocol (see for example our experiments
with DPI tools in Section 10.3).
2 Since Sep. 2017, some changes were introduced to Tor: Scram-
bleSuit is no longer supported and was replaced by obfs4.
Snowflake PT [39] is now available in the Tor Browser for some
operating systems.
On the other hand, structured stream protocols that
mimic widely used protocols, are resistant to white-
listing based blocking. However, they do not protect
against active probing [12, 20].
Our goal is to improve random stream protocols
by using the advantages of structured stream protocols,
while maintaining their protection against active prob-
ing. We believe that the separation of these protocols to
a handshake and communication phase, and encapsula-
tion of their handshake in packets of a known, widely
used, white-listed protocol, will strengthen their ability
to avoid censorship and detection by DPIs.
DNS was chosen as a protocol to encapsulate the
handshake and meet the conditions discussed before for
the following reasons:
1. It is one of the most critical protocols of the Inter-
net [31]. Blocking or greatly interfering with this
protocol for any reason will induce unacceptable
costs on the censoring countries.
2. DNS queries can be automatically relayed from one
DNS server to another, until they reach their final
destination (recursive DNS queries). This allows re-
laying data between several DNS servers as an addi-
tional layer of protection against connections’ track-
ing and blocking.
3. DNS is a UDP-based protocol. UDP is connection-
less and the efforts required to perform DPI of UDP
traffic are significantly higher compared to TCP
traffic.
We note that the DNS encapsulation is proposed only
for the handshake phase.
1.1 Our Contribution
DNS-Morph is implemented as an obfuscation layer for
random stream protocols. This layer encapsulates the
protocol handshake in DNS queries and responses in a
way that avoids protocol abnormalities (i.e., a sequence
of DNS packets without response, followed by a “burst”
of responses, a sequence of packets with identical length,
oddly structured domain names, etc.). Also, the limited
DNS communication avoids tools that defeat IP over
DNS tunneling.3
3 Encapsulating the two phases of a protocol into DNS packets
will cause high DNS traffic, which can raise suspicion of DNS
tunneling.
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We focus on the handshake phase in this paper be-
cause it is the phase DPI tools4 and active probes tar-
get when searching for Tor traffic and bridges. Also, we
later discuss (Section 11.1) the possibility of connecting
our DNS-Morph to FTE (which shapes Tor’s data using
regular expressions, and is not active probing resistant)
in order to bypass a white-listing censor while resisting
active probing.
In order to show the advantages of DNS-Morph, we
implemented it in Python and integrated it into Tor’s
Obfsproxy code [30].5 As Obfsproxy works only with
TCP, and our DNS-Morph works with UDP, we added
UDP support to Obfsproxy. We also added acknowl-
edgments and packet reordering on the receiver side,
to provide lightweight transport reliability that UDP
lacks. This contribution may be of independent interest
for PTs that will support UDP communication (e.g., in
Marionette [52]).
We tested our design with the ScrambleSuit proto-
col in two different environments: a non-censoring envi-
ronment and a partially censoring environment. Success
rates, connection timing, and bandwidth are provided in
the experiments Section (Section 10).
Our source code is available online [6].
2 Related Work
Protocol Obfuscation: As of Sep. 2017, five obfusca-
tion protocols were deployed and available to use with
Tor as PTs:
1. Obfs3 [27]: builds an additional layer of encryp-
tion over Tor’s TLS connection in order to hide
its unique characteristics. An un-authenticated cus-
tomized Diffie-Hellman handshake [40] is used to
exchange encryption keys. As a result, this protocol
is susceptible to active probing attacks.
2. ScrambleSuit [59]: protects against active prob-
ing attacks by using out-of-band exchanged secrets
and session tickets for authentication. Scramble-
Suit is also capable of changing its network fin-
gerprint (packet length distribution, inter-arrival
times, etc.). This protocol is the predecessor of
Obfs4 and is subject to white-listing based censor-
ing.
4 DPI traffic detection is based on pattern/signature matching,
anomalies or traffic amount.
5 While Tor has moved to PTs in Go [29], we decided to continue
using the Python Obfsproxy to easy the development.
3. Obfs4 [28]: has the same features as ScrambleSuit,
but utilizes the Elligator technique [49] for public
key obfuscation, and the ntor protocol [14] for one-
way authentication. This results in a faster protocol
than ScrambleSuit and the addition of bridge au-
thentication. This protocol can also be blocked by
white-listing based censoring.
4. Meek [19]: uses a technique called Domain
Fronting [4] to relay the Tor traffic to a Tor bridge
through third-party servers (i.e., CDNs like Amazon
CloudFront and Microsoft Azure).
5. Format-Transforming Encryption (FTE) [51]:
transforms Tor traffic to arbitrary standard pro-
tocols’ formats using their language descriptions.
Some other PTs are also available but are not integrated
in the Tor Browser. These PTs can be found online [13].
Domain Name System: a hierarchical decentralized
naming system that associates various information with
domain names on the Internet [31]. This information is
stored by DNS name servers in DNS records, and can
be obtained by sending DNS queries to these servers
and receiving their responses.
DNS queries can either be iterative (a DNS resolver
client queries a chain of one or more DNS servers, where
each server refers the client to the next server in the
chain) or recursive (a DNS resolver client queries a single
DNS server, which queries other DNS servers on behalf
of that client).6
The DNS protocol runs primarily over UDP (TCP
is rarely used for client queries).
DNS Tunneling: is the act of communicating data
of any content inside DNS queries and responses. This
technique is used for many purposes, among them by-
passing captive portals for paid Wi-Fi services, and
command and control or data exfiltration in mal-
ware [22, 23].
Three components are used in DNS Tunneling:
1. Client which sends data in DNS queries and acts
like a DNS client.
2. Server which tunnels the client data and sends back
DNS responses like a DNS server. This server usu-
ally has a registered domain name.
3. Encapsulation mechanism of data into DNS queries
and responses, and a corresponding decapsulation
6 DNS caching is irrelevant to our work as our DNS client sends
new DNS queries each time.
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mechanism for extracting this data from the DNS
queries and responses.
Several DNS Tunneling packages are currently avail-
able, some of them are Dnscat [9], Dns2tcp [8], and io-
dine [16]. On the other side, there are techniques for
DNS Tunneling detection (e.g., based on the amount of
DNS traffic [15]).
3 Threat Model
Our threat model consists of a nation-state censor that
desires to block users from connecting to Tor. This cen-
sor might use DPI to examine session packets and ac-
tive probing to check whether suspected servers are Tor
bridges or servers. This censor might also be moving
towards a white-listing strategy and start blocking ac-
cess to applications for personal use like Skype [38] or
WhatsApp [46]. However, we assume that the censor
may not be willing to block fundamental services like
HTTP, DNS, IMAP, and FTP, as this can break legit-
imate communications, thus inducing high economical
costs and causing unbearable collateral damage.
We believe this threat model is realistic as recent
reports suggest that some censoring countries are con-
tinuously tightening their Internet control and taking
a comprehensive approach to block all outgoing VPNs
traffic during the year of 2018 [5].
We also assume that the censor does not perform
DNS poisoning. Assumptions about such an attack and
possible mitigations are discussed in Section 11.1 (Fu-
ture Works).
4 Obfsproxy Design
Obfsproxy [30] is an open source software written using
Python, and is used by Tor. This software implements
the PT design mentioned before, in addition to the ob-
fuscation protocols obfs3 and ScrambleSuit.
Due to the fact that our DNS-Morph is integrated
into Obfsproxy, we first describe the Obfsproxy design,
and then (in Section 5) the modifications done to sup-
port DNS-Morph.
Figure 2 (without the red dashed parts) shows the
Obfsproxy high level design. Each side, the client and
the server, consists of two entities: a Tor client and an
Obfsproxy client on the client side, and an Obfsproxy
server and a Tor bridge on the bridge side.
Obfsproxy components have two main layers: a net-
working layer, responsible for connections’ establish-
ment, and an obfuscation layer, responsible for the Tor
handshake and the data obfuscation.
The connection between the Tor client and the Tor
bridge is composed of three components:
1. An “Upstream” connection between the Tor client
and the Obfsproxy client on the client side.
2. A “Downstream” connection between the Obf-
sproxy client and the Obfsproxy server.
3. An “Upstream” connection between the Obfsproxy
server and the Tor bridge on the bridge side.
The chronological operation flow of a Tor client and a
Tor bridge is as follows:
1. Client side: launches an Obfsproxy client, which
starts a TCP SOCKS listener on its upstream con-
nection.
Bridge side: launches Tor bridge and the Obfsproxy
server. The Obfsproxy server starts a TCP listener
on its downstream connection. The Tor bridge starts
a TCP listener on its upstream connection.
2. Client side: when the Tor client is launched by the
user, it connects to the SOCKS TCP listener of the
Obfsproxy client on its side. Then, the Obfsproxy
client initiates a TCP connection to the Obfsproxy
server on the bridge side (downstream connection).
3. Bridge side: when the Obfsproxy server receives the
downstream connection request from the Obfsproxy
client, it starts its obfuscation layer.
4. Client side: when the downstream TCP connection
is established, the client side initiates its obfuscation
layer which commences the handshake between the
Obfsproxy client and server.
5. If the protocol handshake fails then Obfsproxy mod-
ules on both sides close their downstream connec-
tion and return to Step 1. If the handshake succeeds,
the Obfsproxy server connects to the Tor bridge (up-
stream connection) and starts receiving data from
the Obfsproxy client (downstream connection), de-
crypting it, and then sending it to the bridge.
At the end of Step 5, the connection between the Tor
client and the bridge is fully functional, and the Tor
client is connected to the Tor network through the Tor
bridge.
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Fig. 2. DNS-Morph design: consists of the Obfsproxy design and the new components (dashed red): downstream UDP
connector, DNS-Morph, and a local DNS server
5 DNS-Morph Design
The fact that the handshake phase and the encrypted
data exchange phase are two separate phases, this allows
us to separate them also is the Obfsproxy design and
change properties of each phase without affecting the
other one.
We now describe our modifications to the Obfsproxy
design to replace its handshake by a DNS-based once.
Our new DNS-Morph design is shown in Figure 2, and
includes three added components (highlighted in dashed
red):
1. Local DNS server: this is a standard DNS server
that receives DNS queries and returns DNS re-
sponses, used for active probing resistance, as ex-
plained in Section 8.
2. Downstream UDP connector: the connector sends
and receives UDP packets. The connector also takes
care of the reliability functionality (as discussed in
Section 6).
3. DNS-Morph component:
(a) Encodes/decodes data to/from Base32 [34].
(b) Chops data into fragments and encapsulates
them into DNS queries or responses.
(c) Decapsulates data fragments from DNS queries
or responses, and reassembles these fragments.
(d) Encrypts/decrypts data.
(e) Builds DNS queries and responses.
(f) Communicates with the local DNS server to
send and receive queries and responses.
Our changes to the original Obfsproxy flow of operation
in order to support the DNS-Morph flow of operation
are:
1. Downstream connection was changed from TCP to
UDP. The Obfsproxy server listens on port 53 UDP,
like a standard DNS server7 [48].
2. Obfsproxy client initiates a UDP downstream con-
nection on port 53 to the server. Using the DNS-
Morph module, handshake data is encoded to
Base32, chopped into fragments of length 20–50
characters,8 and encapsulated into DNS queries of
type A (address mapping records).
These queries are sent to the Obfsproxy server using
direct or indirect routes:
(a) Direct: Obfsproxy client sends the queries di-
rectly to the Obfsproxy server’s address.
7 The Obfsproxy server can be easily configured to listen on
other ports, but DNS queries directed to a UDP port other than
53 look suspicious.
8 [56, p. 251] suggests that the average DNS query length is 36–
59 bytes. [21] suggests that most of the DNS packets that were
captured were of size 70–98 bytes, if we subtract from these sizes
the size of an empty DNS packet (40 bytes = 20 bytes for IPv4
header [37] + 8 bytes for UDP header [36] + 12 bytes for DNS
header [31]) we will get a domain name length of 30–58 bytes.
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(b) Indirect: Obfsproxy client uses the recursive
DNS property and sends the queries with a do-
main name registered by the Obfsproxy server
operator. This way the DNS queries travel be-
tween different DNS servers until they reach
the Obfsproxy server, which adds an additional
layer of protection against connections tracking
and blocking.
Direct route usage might look anomalous [54, p. 28],
hence, we recommend using the indirect route.
3. The total length in bytes of the handshake data is
encoded inside the first DNS packet, so that the
receiving side knows when to stop receiving data,
and start processing it.
4. The Obfsproxy server buffers each DNS query it re-
ceives, until the total length is reached. In order
to preserve resemblance to a standard DNS server,
the Obfsproxy server sends the received queries to
the local DNS server available on its side. When
a response is received from the DNS server, the
Obfsproxy server sends it back to the Obfsproxy
client. When the buffered data forms a complete
handshake data, the DNS-Morph module decodes
it from Base32, reassembles it, and forwards it to
the obfuscation protocol layer, which continues pro-
cessing it using the specified obfuscation protocol
(e.g., ScrambleSuit).
5. After the Obfsproxy client finishes sending the
handshake data, it should receive handshake data
from the Obfsproxy server. As a result, the Obf-
sproxy client sends one additional dummy DNS
query9 so that the Obfsproxy server can start send-
ing back its handshake data as a response to this
query. The dummy query is used by the Obfsproxy
client to trigger transmission of the handshake data
by the Obfsproxy server shaped as DNS responses.
6. When the Obfsproxy server sends back its proto-
col handshake data, it encodes it to Base32, chops
it into fragments of length 20–50 bytes, and encap-
sulates them into CNAME DNS records (CNAME
records can contain textual data and are relatively
widely used). Then sends these records encapsulated
together with A type records as responses to the
dummy type A DNS queries which the Obfsproxy
client sent before. Again, the first DNS response
packet will include the total length of the Obfsproxy
server sent handshake. The Obfsproxy client decap-
9 We call a DNS query/response dummy if they contain no
protocol handshake data.
sulates the data from the DNS responses, buffers
it, and keeps sending dummy queries until a com-
plete handshake data is received. Then, the Obf-
sproxy client decodes the received handshake data
back from Base32, reassembles it, and forwards it
to the obfuscation layer.
7. When the protocol handshake is successfully com-
pleted, and tickets and/or session keys are created,
both Obfsproxy sides switch from a UDP down-
stream connection to a TCP connection. The Obf-
sproxy server side launches a TCP downstream lis-
tener on a port exchanged out-of-band and waits for
the Obfsproxy client to connect back to it. When the
TCP connection happens, the connection between
the Tor client and the bridge is fully functional.
In case of a protocol handshake failure, both the
Obfsproxy client and server close their downstream
connection, and the Obfsproxy server continues to
behave like a standard DNS server.
Discussions about the encrypted communication
phase after the handshake phase can be found in
Section 11.1.
6 DNS-Morph Reliability
DNS-Morph depends on UDP, hence, we cannot rely
on the network transport layer to provide reliable data
transmission. Therefore, our implementation must guar-
antee arrival of the sent packets to the receiver’s ob-
fuscation layer in the same order that they were sent
in, while adding a minimal delay. To achieve this, we
use two main methods: the first includes acknowledg-
ments on each received packet by the receiver, and a
re-transmission mechanism. The second includes sort-
ing the packets in an appropriate order when they are
received so they can be properly processed.
6.1 Received Packets Acknowledgments
The receiver sends an acknowledgment each time it re-
ceives a packet. If the sender does not get an acknowl-
edgment, it means that the packet or its acknowledg-
ment has failed to reach their destination, so the sender
must resend the packet.
We divide the handshake phase into two parts ac-
cording to the different roles played by the Obfsproxy
client:
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1. Obfsproxy client sends handshake data: each
time it sends a DNS shaped packet, the Obfsproxy
server should send back an acknowledgment in the
shape of a valid DNS response to this query.
The Obfsproxy client behaves similarly to the selec-
tive repeat protocol using a window size of 4 pack-
ets, with a few modifications due to the random-
ized DNS query ID. Obfsproxy client stores the sent
packets in a list sorted by their sending order. The
query ID serves as a search key to the list. Each time
the client receives an acknowledgment it removes
the matching packet from the list. If three acknowl-
edgments are received, but none of them matches
the first packet in the list, then this packet is resent
with a new DNS query ID.
For example: if the Obfsproxy client has sent four
DNS packets and the first three acknowledgments
it received matched the second, the third, and the
fourth packets in the list, then it will resend the first
packet. This can be seen in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. DNS acknowledgments and resending
clinet-to-server.
2. Obfsproxy client receives handshake data: as
explained before, each dummy DNS query sent by
the Obfsproxy client during this part serves two pur-
poses, the first is to trigger the Obfsproxy server to
send one additional handshake packet as a response
to the dummy DNS query, and the second is to ac-
knowledge receiving the previous handshake packet
sent by the Obfsproxy server.
During this part, the Obfsproxy client implements
the stop and wait protocol: each time the Obfsproxy
client wishes to receive handshake data, it sends a
dummy DNS query and waits a while (discussed
later) for the Obfsproxy server to send its hand-
shake data as a response to this query. If nothing is
received from the Obfsproxy server, then the Obf-
sproxy client resends the last DNS packet.10 This
procedure is repeated twice (the same packet is sent
at most three times in total), and if no responses are
received after that, the handshake process is termi-
nated (in a failure).
The time the Obfsproxy client waits for a handshake
packet before resending the dummy DNS packet
again is calculated by the known weighted average
formula for round trip time measuring:
Definition 1. Let RTTnew be the newly sampled
RTT.
Definition 2. Let RTTold be the previously calcu-
lated RTT.
Then:
RTT = (α×RTTnew) + ((1− α)×RTTold)
See more details in [50, p. 226]. We use α = 1/8 as
recommended in [35].
6.2 Sorting Received Packets
DNS-Morph adds to each packet a 16-bit identity num-
ber which is encrypted (as further explained in Sec-
tion 6.2.1) and then encoded using Base32 to 4 ASCII
characters in the packet’s payload.11 This number is ini-
tialized to the length of the total sent data in the pay-
load of the first DNS packet, and is increased by one
each time a packet is sent, so newly sent packets have a
bigger identity number than the previously sent ones.
Each time a packet is received, the receiver decodes
and then decrypts the DNS-Morph identity bytes of its
payload (discussed in Section 7), checks if they form a
legal identifying number, and if they do, the packet’s
data is buffered. When the whole handshake data is re-
ceived, the receiver sorts the packets according to the
identity number and reassembles them back to a real
handshake data, passing it to the obfuscation layer for
further processing.
In case of receiving two packets with the same
identity number, the receiver does not buffer the sec-
ond received packet but acknowledges the sender about
it. This can happen for example because: 1. the first
packet’s acknowledgment failed to reach the sender, so
the sender resends the packet. 2. an attacker is trying to
10 Resending a failed DNS query with the same DNS identifier
is a common practice among DNS resolvers.
11 The first 4 characters of the payload, as discussed in Sec-
tion 7.
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send a packet that contains the same identity number
in its payload.
6.2.1 DNS-Morph Identifiers’ Encryption and
Decryption
Encrypting the DNS-Morph identifier inside the en-
coded data of the DNS packets relies on an out-of-band
shared password (in a similar way as ScrambleSuit and
obfs4), which can be exchanged using the out-of-band
communication channel of Tor, used to distribute bridge
descriptors [41] or any other out-of-band channel the
users agree on to exchange bridges descriptors. We note
that DNS-Morph can also use the already out-of-band
exchanged passwords as long as these passwords are
strong.
Our encryption uses 128-bit AES in counter mode.
For each identifier, a new key and an IV are created
as the output of: HMAC-SHA-256(shared password, X
|| handshake data encoded in the current packet) [33],
when X=0 for Obfsproxy client encryption, X=1 for
Obfsproxy server encryption, and || means concatena-
tion.
This encryption protects the identifier from being
read without the knowledge of the shared key. This pro-
tects DNS-Morph from censoring attacks that identify
the masked Tor connection by saving all DNS traffic be-
tween two connecting entities A and B, extracting the
characters that include the identifier, decoding them,
and checking whether:
1. The decoded characters form sequential numbers
(identifiers).
2. The decoded characters of the first DNS packet form
a number that matches the total length of the data
in all the DNS packets.
This fingerprinting attempt exposes DNS-Morph, but
as the identifiers are encrypted, it fails.
6.3 DNS-Morph Multiple Sessions
Support
In addition to encrypting the DNS-Morph identifiers,
DNS-Morph also supports multiple clients handshake
sessions by adding an encrypted 8-bit session ID to the
packet’s payload. This ID is randomly chosen by the
DNS-Morph client and is encrypted together with the
DNS-Morph identifiers using the same keys and IVs.
The average number of online Tor bridges in the last two
years (2016–2017) is about 2600. The average number
of Tor bridge users in the same period is about 50,000
users per day [43]. A rough estimation suggests that
each bridge serves about 20 users a day. The probability
that two of these users connect at the same the time to
the same bridge and conduct a DNS-Morph handshake
is small. Hence, a 8-bit session identifier seems sufficient
to support several handshake attempts simultaneously
(although this can be changed if necessary in the future,
e.g., letting the bridges to choose this parameter).
7 DNS-Morph Encoded Packets
We now show how the encoded handshake data looks
inside a DNS query and a DNS response packets.
Consider, for example, handshake data that a
ScrambleSuit client sends to the Obfsproxy server. After
encoding this data using Base32 we receive encoded data
of 450 characters. This data is chopped to fragments
of length 20–50 characters, the first fragment of the
chopped data looks like this “ti3zuto4jrz5r22wsu4ar”.
To encapsulate this fragment inside a DNS query packet,
we need to add encrypted DNS-Morph identity and ses-
sion identity to it. The key and IV for the encryption
of the DNS-Morph identity and session identity are cre-
ated by:
Key || IV = HMAC-SHA-256(shared password, 0 ||
ti3zuto4jrz5r22wsu4ar)
After computing the key and the IV, we use them to
encrypt the DNS-Morph identity (which is 450 - the
encoded handshake length in characters for the first
packet) and the session identity, which is randomly gen-
erated by the client (95 for example).
“enpin” = Encode32(AES-CTRK||IV )(450||95))
After computing the encrypted DNS-Morph ID and
the session ID, they are encoded and then concate-
nated with “ti3zuto4jrz5r22wsu4ar”, and with the string
“.bridge.domain”, to create the query:
“enpinti3zuto4jrz5r22wsu4ar.bridge.domain”
which is then encapsulated in a DNS packet and sent to
the Tor bridge side. The bridge side, decodes the first
5 characters of the query, decrypts them using the rest
part of the query not including “.bridge.domain”, and
the shared password. Then, it finds out that the length
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of the encoded handshake to receive for session 95 is 450
characters.
The response packet sent by the Obfsproxy server is
a DNS response packet as generated by the local DNS
server.
8 DNS-Morph: Security Analysis
We now discuss the security of our DNS-Morph design.
Since DNS-Morph was built as an additional protection
layer for random stream protocols, it inherits their secu-
rity properties as a carrier protocol for them. The aim of
this section is to prove that DNS-Morph does not harm
the security properties of the encapsulated protocol but
enhances them.
After DNS-Morph finishes the handshake phase the
encapsulated protocol will still enjoy the same security
properties as before, while its handshake security was
enhanced.
We further discuss the security design of DNS-
Morph assuming that the encapsulated protocols satisfy
some conditions:
1. They must have a handshake phase.
2. They must be active probing resistant.
3. Their traffic (the handshake and the encrypted data
exchange phases) must be indistinguishable from
randomness.
4. They must provide data integrity. Providing data
authenticity is recommended but is not a must.
5. The traffic exchanged during the handshake should
be as short as possible without affecting the security
properties of the protocol, as it affects the number
of DNS packets exchanged using DNS-Morph (dis-
cussed more later).
8.1 Censor’s DPI Capabilities
We now further elaborate on our assumptions concern-
ing the censor’s capabilities. We assume that the censor
has the following DPI capabilities (which are used to de-
tect DNS tunneling) installed in its ISP infrastructure,
either on the DNS servers themselves, or on dedicated
firewall/routers:
1. The DPI mechanism can sort DNS packets by their
arrival times, build a pseudo-session out of them
using a 4-tuple (UDP, IPclient, IPserver, Portserver),
and attempt to detect the structure of “a session”.
2. The DPI mechanism can search the DNS packets
payload for any structural data such as counters,
flags or words to signal “start”, “stop”, “resend”,
etc.
3. The DPI mechanism can consider the length of
a DNS query/response and alert if DNS packets
lengths regularities/irregularities are detected. For
example, alerting about any domain name request
longer than 52 characters [7].
4. The DPI mechanism can consider the number of
DNS queries/responses for each 4-tuple or domain
name, and alert if this number exceeds a certain
threshold, or if the number of queries and responses
differs significantly from what can be classified as
benign behavior.
5. The DPI mechanism can detect irregular DNS pack-
ets sequences, e.g., a series of queries followed by a
series of responses.
6. The DPI mechanism can use regular expressions or
entropy estimation to detect suspicious DNS pack-
ets payloads.
We note that our assumptions grant the censor capa-
bilities that may be stronger than what commercially
available DPI systems are performing. We are unaware
of any country that combines all these capabilities while
performing DPI.
8.2 DNS-Morph DPI Resistance
We added to DNS-Morph the following counter-
measures that defeat the above DPI threat model, and
make it exposure resistant:
1. DNS-Morph can send its packets in an arbitrary or-
der and sort them on the receiver side, by decrypting
the encrypted identifiers, thus, defeating the adver-
sary’s ability to detect the order of the packets and
the internal session structure.
2. DNS-Morph encodes the encrypted payload in-
side DNS queries/responses, and concatenates en-
crypted packet and session IDs. If a DPI searches
for any structural data in the payload, it will fail to
find any, as all the encoded handshake data looks
random.
3. All the DNS queries/responses of DNS-Morph are
of random size between 20–50 bytes, which is the
size of a standard DNS query/response [21, 56], and
should not raise any suspicion due to length. Thus,
defeating the adversary’s attempts to detect length
regularities/irregularities.
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4. The number of DNS-Morph exchanged
queries/responses depends on the encapsulated pro-
tocol. If we take ScrambleSuit for example, we can
make some modifications (i.e., reduce its padding
size, discussed in Section 10), which will not affect
the protocol security traits when DNS-Morph is
added, but can reduce the total amount of DNS ex-
changed packets to as little as 26 DNS packets, an
amount not so far from the number of DNS packets
exchanged when visiting popular websites such as
Google (10–17 packets), YouTube (11–13 packets),
Facebook (24–27 packets), Yahoo (60 packets), and
Reddit (40 packets), which are among Alexa’s top
10 global websites for the year 2017 [2]. Registering
more than one domain name on the DNS-Morph
server IP (or two IP addresses controlled by the
bridge) is an additional mitigation that minimizes
the number of DNS packets sent to the same domain
name. As discussed in Section 10.1, this approach
is cheap and is also relatively easy to configure.
5. The Obfsproxy server cannot send a DNS response
without receiving a DNS query. A small delay can
be added while the Obfsproxy client sends the DNS
queries, which can eliminate DNS sequence abnor-
malities.
6. It is hard to use regular expressions in order to
check for the “validity” of domain names with-
out getting a lot of false positives, as many
domain names nowadays can look random (or
have a random looking part). Examples can be
seen while browsing to “https://edition.cnn.com/”,
a DNS type A query having the content
“d3c8wvwvehjsxe.cloudfront.net” is sent by the
DNS client. An additional example can be
seen while browsing to “https://www.yahoo.com”,
a type A DNS query including the content
“shim.btrll.com” is sent to the DNS server, and
a DNS response including two records is re-
ceived, one of these records include the CNAME
“d3qdfnco3bamip.cloudfront.net” can be seen. Re-
sponses like that can be received as a result of load
balancing services deployed to distribute the traf-
fic to the most available server to handle the re-
quest. Even if we assume that a censor uses a reg-
ular expression to check domain names “validity”,
one can take this same regular expression and use
it to encode DNS-Morph data, e.g., using FTE [51].
We compare CloudFront domain names with DNS-
Morph produced ones in Section 8.5.
8.3 Additional Attacks and Resistance
In addition to using DPI, a censor can tamper with DNS
packets payload in many ways, such as:
1. The censor can change uppercase letters to lower-
case, and vice versa. This change should not affect
real DNS as it is case-insensitive, but might affect
encoded and encapsulated data as changing cases
changes bytes of the real data. As discussed in Sec-
tion 9, our method of encoding and decoding data
is resilient to this kind of changes.
2. The censor can change the DNS packet payload data
or some of it (e.g., DNS poisoning). While deem-
ing DNS poisoning out of this research scope, it is
important to note that DNS poisoning in this con-
text is a denial of service attack, i.e., it will cause a
handshake failure, but will not reveal more informa-
tion about the exchanged data than the information
that was revealed by the original handshake. This
means that if, for example the data exchanged is
encrypted using an out-of-band key, DNS poisoning
will not disclose the fact that a Tor communication
happened, nor the keys used to encrypt it.
3. The censor can inject DNS packets in two different
ways:
(a) The injected DNS packet contains random data.
The receiver will not consider this packet as a
part of the handshake as the possibility of this
data to include an encrypted identifier using the
out-of-band keys, is small.
(b) The injected DNS packet is a replayed packet.
As explained in Section 6 this packet will be
considered as a network reliability issue and
will not be considered as part of the exchanged
handshake.
4. The censor can observe the DNS responses sent back
by the server, and try to launch an HTTP session
to the IP written in these responses in order to ex-
amine if this IP points to a real server. Assuming
that the IP returned by the DNS server is the IP of
the DNS-Morph server, this server can run a simple
HTTP server that displays (or otherwise redirects
to) a random web-page, for example, an HTML page
is returned each time including a random “fortune
cookie” wisdom saying/quote (i.e., an HTTP for-
tune daemon).
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8.4 Active Probing and Replay Attack
Resistance
Our new Obfsproxy server acts like a real DNS server.
Each time a DNS query is received, a real DNS response
is sent back by a real DNS server. Assuming that the ob-
fuscated protocol is active probing resistant, the probe
will send DNS packets and receive real DNS responses. If
the probe does not know the out-of-band shared pass-
word/key between the real Tor client and bridge, the
obfuscated protocol on the Obfsproxy server side will re-
ject the probe’s handshake request, while the Obfsproxy
server will continue to respond as a real DNS server.
The same also holds with respect to replay attacks
assuming that the obfuscated protocol is replay-attack
resistant. The obfuscated protocol will reject any re-
played packet, while the Obfsproxy server continues to
respond to it as a real DNS server.
8.5 Domain Names’ Entropy
To show that the domain names used by DNS-Morph
have the same entropy capacity as of regular domain
names used in CDNs we have performed a simple test.
We took 32 DNS packets directed at CloudFront ser-
vices and 36 DNS packets obtained from a DNS-Morph
handshake. We applied gzip and bzip2 to a file contain-
ing only the prefix of the domain names. The compres-
sion ratio using gzip of the CloudFront domain names
was 66.5% whereas of the DNS-Morph domain names
was 67.3%. In the case of bzip2, the ratios are 70% and
71.2%, respectively.
Given the fact that the handshake is done once per
session, it is easy to see that attacks based on estimating
the entropy in the domain names are unlikely to offer
high precision due to the small difference in compres-
sion rates (suggesting somewhat related entropy capac-
ity) [57].
9 DNS-Morph Design
Considerations
Choice of DNS
We now discuss various trade-offs we made in DNS-
Morph’s design, and explain our design decisions: First,
as mentioned before DNS is an essential Internet pro-
tocol, and its complete blocking is highly unlikely due
to the high cost of doing so, namely, practically discon-
necting from the internet. In addition, DNS supports
a variety of query types which gives us more freedom
in choosing the record type that can encapsulate our
encoded data.
Following the selection of DNS, we had to use UDP
(TCP sessions in DNS are usually used for zone trans-
fers between DNS servers). This resulted in the need to
add a reliability layer for DNS-Morph as loss of even
a single packet of handshake data on any side causes a
handshake failure (discussed more in Section 6).
In addition, the following actions were taken to en-
able DNS-Morph to mimic (as much as possible) an or-
dinary DNS communication:
We decided to add dummy DNS queries/responses
which do not carry handshake data on both sides during
the handshake phase, in order to prevent DNS protocol
anomalies where the client sends multiple queries, and
the server responds with multiple answers after all the
requests were received, or the Obfsproxy server sending
DNS responses without any sent queries.
Choice of Base32
We chose Base32 for encoding the handshake data which
can include any byte value into characters that follow
the domain name system rules [31]:
1. Domain name can include labels and the character
“.”.
2. Labels must start and end with a letter or a digit,
and have as interior characters only letters, digits,
and hyphens.
3. Letters can be any one of the 52 alphabetic charac-
ters “A–Z” in uppercase and “a–z” in lowercase.
4. Digits can be any one of the ten digits “0–9”.
While we could have used Base64 [34] or Base58 [3],
DNS is not case sensitive. In such encodings, a censor
can rewrite every single DNS query to a lowercase one,
which does not harm normal DNS requests, but breaks
DNS-Morph. These factors narrow our encoding options
to a base that has uppercase letters or lowercase letters,
but not both. Base32 includes the alphabetic characters
“A–Z”, the digits “2–7” and the character “=”, which is
suitable for our uses after changing it to the digit “1”. We
also changed the uppercase letters that Base32 produces
to lowercase letters inside the DNS queries/responses in
order to make them look more consistent with regular
DNS queries/responses. All the letters on the receiver
side are converted back to uppercase before the Base32
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decoding process, which makes our design resistant to
attacks like the one described before.
We note that we can also use Base36, which includes
the alphabetic characters “A–Z” and the digits “0–9”.
Using Base36 can protect DNS-Morph against a censor
with the ability to spot the lack of the digits “0, 8, 9”
from DNS-Morph packets, as these digits can appear
in DNS labels, but are not included in our modified
Base32. However, we decided to not use this for the ease
of implementation. Future works may wish to explore
that approach.
Query Types
In our choice of which DNS query/responses types to use
for handshake data encapsulation, we used the following
guidelines:
1. The type of the DNS query/response must accept
by their definition the amount and the character
set of the data we want to encapsulate inside them.
For example, the type A query can include charac-
ters and numbers (domain names), but the type A
response includes 32-bit IPv4 addresses, thus, en-
capsulating encoded data that does not look like a
valid IPv4 address inside a type A response is not
possible.
2. Using certain DNS query/response packet
types must not contradict the general DNS
query/response types statistics over the Internet.
3. The types of the queries and responses must match.
To send the Obfsproxy client handshake data, we use
type A queries, and receive type A responses from the
Obfsproxy server. To send the Obfsproxy server hand-
shake data, we use CNAME and A DNS records, which
are encapsulated together in the same DNS packet, and
sent as DNS responses for type A DNS queries. We chose
these types because they meet the aforementioned con-
ditions, and in the same time are widely used on the
Internet. The encapsulation of these records in DNS
packets is done using the “dnslib” Python library [10],
aiming to build DNS packets that look as real DNS
client/server packets.
Recursive DNS
Finally, we decided to use the recursive DNS prop-
erty and send the queries with a domain name regis-
tered by the Obfsproxy server operator, in order to pro-
tect against packets tracking. This also enables to by-
pass networks’ firewall rules which forbid a direct DNS
packet to be sent outside the network, besides the net-
work’s own DNS server.
10 Tests And Results
We have implemented our DNS-Morph design using
Python, and tested it successfully with the Scramble-
Suit PT. ScrambleSuit has two handshake methods, de-
picted in Figure 4.
Using Method 1 a client and a server generate
4096-bit even private keys x and y, respectively, and
the corresponding public keys X = gx(mod p), Y =
gy(mod p). After exchanging the public keys, they agree
on a shared private key kt = Y x(mod p) = Xy(mod p).
Then, using the shared key, the server sends back an
encrypted ticket and a new private key, which the client
will use for their future connections with handshake
method 2 . An out-of-band shared key kB is used to
calculate the MACs and the marks (used to facilitate
the localization of the MACs).
Our tests were performed on ScrambleSuit using
method 1 , as we wanted to simulate a newly connected
client, furthermore, a larger amount of data is sent when
using this method, thus, making it harder to defend.
10.1 Test Setup
For our experiments, we set up Tor clients in two dif-
ferent environments, more information about these en-
vironments can be found in Section 10.2. These clients
connect to a Tor bridge residing at a university located
in Israel which has two types of ISPs, ones that cen-
sor the Internet and the others do not. The bridge is
connected to the Internet using an ISP not known for
any censoring activities. The two sides (the client’s sides
and the bridges’ sides) had the Obfsproxy software with
the DNS-Morph component, and tried to establish Tor’s
first connection to a bridge. We ran 30 connection at-
tempts in each test, measuring rates of successful hand-
shakes, their timing, and their bandwidth.
Between connection attempts, all the temporary
files and session states generated by previous attempts
(e.g., session tickets) were deleted to ensure that Scram-
bleSuit generates everything and behaves the same all
the time.
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Fig. 4. ScrambleSuit’s handshake methods.
With this setup, we performed three different experi-
ments:
1. “Original Design” tests, to test the original Obf-
sproxy without DNS-Morph. This Obfsproxy uses
TCP only.
2. “DNS-Morph Direct” tests, to test the Obfsproxy
including DNS-Morph. The Obfsproxy client con-
nections to the Obfsproxy server were direct, i.e.,
DNS queries were sent from the client directly to
the Obfsproxy server address.
3. “DNS-Morph Indirect” tests, to test the Obfsproxy,
including DNS-Morph. The Obfsproxy client con-
nections to the Obfsproxy server were indirect, and
DNS queries were sent indirectly to the Obfsproxy
server address by other DNS servers (using recursive
DNS queries).
For our “DNS-Morph” tests, we also did one additional
type of tests: we decreased the maximal size of the
random padding added to the protocol (see Figure 4).
ScrambleSuit picks a random padding length of 0–1308
bytes to change the protocol’s signature. Due to the use
of DNS queries, such a protection is less needed. Thus,
we tested the system when the maximal size of the ran-
dom padding is at most 100 bytes (compared with 1308
originally).
Decreasing the padding length range reduces the
maximal total number of DNS packets (queries and
responses) per DNS-Morph handshake from 458 pack-
ets to 96 packets and the average total number from
262 packets to 81 packets (the minimal total number
stays 26 packets). By doing so, we wanted to check if
the handshake time improves, and if as a result of DNS
servers offloading (DNS-Morph indirect), the handshake
success rates will be higher compared to the first type
tests, as DNS servers will be more willing to serve us.
It is also worth mentioning that technically, the only
difference between running our Obfsproxy client and
server versions for the original designs tests and the
DNS-Morph direct tests is the flags they receive from
the command line when they are launched.
The difference between running the DNS-Morph di-
rect and indirect tests is the domain name we bought
for our Obfsproxy server (for an annual price of 0.88
USD [24]), configuring the name server of our domain
name to point to our Obfsproxy server’s IP, and chang-
ing one flag from “direct” to “indirect” when launching
the Obfsproxy client and server.
More technical information about running and test-
ing our DNS-Morph version of Obfsproxy can be found
in the research Github repository [6].
10.2 Clients’ Testing Environments
We setup two Tor clients in two different environments
to test DNS-Morph behavior in a censoring environment
and in an environment not known for censorship.
Environment 1: This environment is a city in
Italy. Italy is not known for acts of Tor censoring.
In this environment our Tor client had no problems in
connecting to directory servers, obtaining relays descrip-
tors, and connecting to these relays. The Tor client also
succeeded while connecting to a Tor bridge using any
of the obfuscation protocols. By setting up a Tor client
in this environment, we wanted to test if DNS-Morph
works well (including its reliability functionalities dis-
cussed before) in a normative environment which does
not seek to block it in any way.
Results for Environment 1 (non-censoring):
We performed numerous connection tests during a pe-
riod of 3 months (May–July 2017). Table 1 contains the
results of the tests done on the 5th of July 2017, as a
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typical example for these results. We chose to present
the results of only one day as all the other days produced
similar results.
Taking into consideration the fact that no censor-
ing acts were observed, and the relatively large distance
between Israel and Italy (about 2500 km), the success
rates when DNS-Morph data was relayed between DNS
servers (DNS-Morph indirect) are lower (90% and 93%)
than the success rates when DNS-Morph data was sent
directly to the Tor bridge (100%). Also, we can see that
when the DNS-Morph indirect relayed more data, the
success rates (90%) were lower that the success rates
when the DNS-Morph relayed the shortened version of
ScrambleSuit 93%) as discussed before.
Environment 2: This environment includes an ISP
in Israel, which is well known for censoring Internet
browsing for its customers (who seek this type of cen-
sorship). Content censored by this ISP can be pornog-
raphy, violence, live casting, and videos. While trying
to connect to websites like Google, YouTube, and Face-
book, this ISP asked us to install CA certificates on the
client’s machine. Refusing to do so resulted in blocking
client’s access to these websites. Other websites were
simply blocked without even giving the client an option
to install certificates (i.e., Yahoo, Bing, and The Tor
Project website).
It is worth mentioning that the certificates needed
to be installed by this ISP are self-signed certificates
issued to “Netspark” [26], a company providing real-
time browsing data inspection and web content filtering
services.
Connecting to Tor in this partially blocking ISP:
when trying to connect in the default method, we en-
countered failures during different phases such as con-
necting to the directory servers, loading relay descrip-
tors, or connecting to the entry relay. Trying to connect
using obfs3 or FTE always failed.
Choosing obfs4 succeeded sometimes and on the
other times it failed. Even on successful attempts a lot
of the bridges were blocked. Connecting to another ISP
from the same test machine gave us a behavior similar
to “Environment 1”.
In conclusion, we suspect that this ISP continuously
collects information about Tor bridges and blocks them.
Results for Environment 2 (censoring): We
performed numerous connection tests during a period
of 2 months (January–February 2018). Table 2 summa-
rizes the results of the tests done on the 10th of February
2018, as a typical example for these results. We chose
to present the results of only one day as all the other
days produced similar results.
Despite the fact that the Tor client was connecting
to the Tor bridge using a censoring ISP, this ISP could
not block its connection, not of the original Scramble-
Suit, nor of our DNS-Morph version. This indicates that
DNS-Morph did not harm the original security proper-
ties of ScrambleSuit.
The 100% success rates in all the experiments can
be explained by the fact that the client and the server
are located in the same country but connected to dif-
ferent ISPs. The distance between the Tor client and
the Tor bridge in this environment is about 50 km (in
comparison to about 2500 km in Environment 1). The
distances in both environments also affect the timing
results between them, as we can see that the timing of
the same experiment is less in Environment 2 than it in
Environment 1.
Further testing in more censoring countries is essen-
tial, as discussed in Section 11.1.
10.3 Deep Packet Inspection Tools
To evaluate DNS-Morph resistance against DPI we
chose two open source tools: nDPI [25] version 2.2.0,
and Libprotoident [18] version 2.0.12. We captured the
packets transmitted between the Tor client and the Tor
bridge from the previous tests (Section 10) using Wire-
shark and ran the two tools to analyze them.
Results: The original Scramblesuit connections
were analyzed as “Unknown TCP” protocol packets by
both tools, nDPI and Libprotoident. The DNS-Morph
connections were analyzed by nDPI as ordinary DNS
packets for the handshake phase, and SSL packets for
the encrypted data exchange after the handshake was
done. Libprotoident on the other hand analyzed the
DNS-Morph connections as ordinary DNS packets for
the handshake phase, and “Unknown TCP” protocol
packets for the encrypted data exchange after the hand-
shake.
11 Summary
In this work we described DNS-Morph, a method to
hide PT’s handshake communication in a series of DNS
queries and replies. We implemented the system and
checked that it successfully establishes a Tor connection
between a Tor client and a Tor bridge.
The use of DNS offers several layers of security for
this process: DNS blocking (or even strong manipula-
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Time (seconds)
Minimum Maximum Average Median Success Rate Bandwidth (bytes)
Original ScrambleSuit 0.532 0.735 0.601 0.589 100% 3705
Original ScrambleSuit with DNS-Morph Direct 1.206 5.378 2.952 2.733 100% 22054
Original ScrambleSuit with DNS-Morph Indirect 1.825 15.727 6.132 5.463 90% 22840
Shortened ScrambleSuit with DNS-Morph Direct 1.077 2.788 1.968 1.979 100% 6070
Shortened ScrambleSuit with DNS-Morph Indirect 1.643 5.441 2.971 2.539 93% 6743
ScrambleSuit - Original: ScrambleSuit with the original padding (0–1308 bytes).
ScrambleSuit - Shortened: ScrambleSuit with a shortened padding (0–100 bytes).
Table 1. Times and success rates of handshakes in Environment 1 (non-censoring).
Time (seconds)
Minimum Maximum Average Median Success Rate Bandwidth (bytes)
Original ScrambleSuit 0.044 0.101 0.087 0.091 100% 4042
Original ScrambleSuit with DNS-Morph Direct 0.891 1.813 1.113 0.953 100% 22140
Original ScrambleSuit with DNS-Morph Indirect 1.844 2.391 2.171 2.189 100% 24350
Shortened ScrambleSuit with DNS-Morph Direct 0.438 0.672 0.542 0.547 100% 6528
Shortened ScrambleSuit with DNS-Morph Indirect 0.594 0.798 0.708 0.719 100% 6621
ScrambleSuit - Original: ScrambleSuit with the original padding (0–1308 bytes).
ScrambleSuit - Shortened: ScrambleSuit with a shortened padding (0–100 bytes).
Table 2. Times and success rates of handshakes in Environment 2 (censoring).
tion) comes at a huge price for the censor, DPI attacks
on DNS are harder to implement, and DNS enjoys an in-
herent resilience to blocking attempts due to the nature
of recursive DNS queries.
In addition, we have added counter-measures de-
signed to defeat UDP sessions’ tracking mechanisms
which, we believe still do not exist today in commer-
cial DPI products.
While we have tested the implementation using the
ScrambleSuit handshake, it is easy to see that this
methodology could work with any PT that satisfies the
conditions stated in Section 8. As already stated, af-
ter the handshake, one can transform the remainder of
the Tor communication to a white-listed protocol using
tools like FTE or meek to maintain white-listed behav-
ior (while enjoying the security against active probing
offered by the protected handshake).
11.1 Future Works
This research can be further developed to include more
interesting topics and answer currently open questions:
– We are aware of the DNS poisoning some countries
conduct not only to block sensitive content but also
to promote local websites [47]. An interesting ap-
proach is to examine what exactly is done by the
censor while performing DNS poisoning, for exam-
ple, does the censor only send poisoned responses
to DNS clients? Does it also block the DNS query
from reaching the real DNS server? Does it permit
it and block its DNS response? Future work will test
whether our DNS-Morph can finish the handshake
despite these DNS poisoning attacks. As noted be-
fore, these attacks will not reveal Tor communica-
tion.
– Our security analysis was based on assumptions
we collected from the literature about DPIs and
DNS tunneling detectors, in addition to examining
DNS-Morph against open source DPI products such
as nDPI [25], and Libprotoident [18]. Obviously, it
would be better to test DNS-Morph in real life cen-
soring countries (as current tests were done in some-
what controlled environments).
– In order to better mimic the behavior of a DNS
client (and fulfill one more of the requirements for
building a successful mimicking protocol [55]), a ser-
vice can be installed on the client machine to col-
lect data about the user’s browsing behavior, such
as: DNS packets timing, size, DNS client behavior
if its query was not answered, etc. When the DNS-
Morph client is started, it can analyze the collected
data to better adapt the specific user and machine
behavior.
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– After DNS-Morph finishes its handshake, the Tor
data exchange phase starts, in which a TCP port is
opened in the Obfsproxy server side and encrypted
Tor data is exchanged. This could also look suspi-
cious for a DPI. One possible solution is to fake a
TLS handshake between the Obfsproxy client and
server after a TCP port is opened and before the
exchange of the Tor encrypted data. This way the
communication looks as ordinary DNS communica-
tion followed by an HTTPS one.
– Currently, DNS-Morph works with A and CNAME
DNS record types. Adding more DNS types will
make it harder for a DNS tunneling detector to
mark our DNS traffic as DNS tunneling traffic. Also,
dummy queries could be made less randomly built
to raise even less suspicion.
– Currently, FTE does not use a pre-shared key to
encrypt Tor data. The key used in FTE is either:
1. Hard-coded in FTE code.
2. Negotiated using Diffie-Hellman.
Both options are not active probing resistant. One
way to overcome this issue can be to initiate DNS-
Morph before FTE, with a handshake like the one
of obfs4 or ScrambleSuit. After the handshake is
successfully completed, Tor obfuscated data can be
tunneled with FTE. This communication will look
like a DNS interaction at first, and then like an
HTTP one, and is expected to succeed in bypass-
ing a fully white-listing censor, and also be active
probing resistant. Future work will examine this is-
sue.
– At the moment DNS-Morph is using Base32 en-
coding (with small modifications) for the domain
name. This may suggest somewhat irregular domain
names, which may cause suspicion. One possible fu-
ture work direction is to use an encoding scheme
which mimics as best as possible real domain names.
This line of research requires first constructing the
regular expressions associated with such names, and
then simply using it for embedding the domain
names.
– One possible extension to DNS-Morph is to use mul-
tiple DNS servers which collaborate. Namely, a fu-
ture development route for DNS-Morph is to run 2
(or more) DNS servers, each accepting some of the
queries of the handshake (and sending back the in-
formation). This way, the tracing of the DNS queries
becomes harder (as the number of queries per DNS
server is reduced), and DPI solutions that track
“pseudo-sessions” have less material to work with,
as each such pseudo-session has a lower bandwidth.
– Finally, another future line of research is design-
ing a new handshake protocol which is both se-
cure against active probing while better utilizing the
properties of DNS communication.
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